GREATER POLAND AS AN ALLY ESSENTIAL TO FRANCE

Analysis of Europe's New Problem Made by Frank H. Simonds Reveals How Necessary It Is for the Gallic Republic to Have Strong Friend in the East to Offset Possible Teuton Ambitions in the Future---Britain's Policy Aims for Peace and Trade but Leaves Way Open for Renewal of War

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

THE persistence of the Upper Silesian trouble, the most disturbing single element in the European situation of the moment, should surprise no American observer of foreign affairs, for the simple reason that Poland, taking the larger question of which the Silesian affair is only one of many phases, is, and will remain for the future, the gravest menace to European stability.

It would be a mistake to charge the responsibility for this to the Poles themselves. In the last three centuries they have been almost habitually the victims, rather than the authors, of European disorder. Yet the fact remains that the situation in which the Polish race finds itself, its relation to its neighbors and its importance to France in the new European adjustment, combine to make it a source for future dangers even greater than that traditional Eastern question, out of which arose the world war.

Since this situation exists and will continue, there is reason for a brief examination of the Polish question, as it now rises once more to trouble the world peace. Looking first at the general European situation, one can perceive that, aside from Polish matters, there is gradually coming about an adjustment which might easily be of long duration. True, there remain many disputes between rival countries—disputes between the Italians and the Southern Slavs over Adriatic frontages; between the Greeks and Italians over Albanian marches and Aegean Islands, between the Hungarians and their several neighbors, who have taken from the Magyar state provinces which contain Rumanian, Slovak and Serbo-Croat majorities. There is a Bulgarian question for Serb, Rumanian and Greek alike. There is a Turkish question for the Greeks.

Frontier Problem of Austria Looms in Central Europe Again

Looking at the centre of Europe, there is the familiar problem of Austria, which is seeking by almost daily demonstration to arrive at union with Germany. The new Bohemian state, too, has a German minority which accepts with ill-grace incorporation in the Czecho-Slovak nation. In a word, all around the edges of the new countries, or the newly expanded small States, there is friction. There may be readjustments, but time alone can bring about real stability. Yet aside from the Austrian issue, conditions are plainly approaching a condition of stabilization. The several treaties, the arrangements between small countries, these give solid basis for hope.

Moreover, when one looks at the larger states, the situation is even more promising. Italy has at last established her guards on the crests of the Alps from Fiume to the Swiss frontier. *Italia Irredenta*, that source of many wars in the last century, has disappeared as an issue. If there are now Slav and German majorities within Italian frontiers as the recent election showed, their claims do not now constitute a European menace. The Treaty of Rapallo between the Jugo-Slav and the Italians has been accepted on both sides of the new frontier and has brought an end to intrigue by Italy and unceasing threat by Slav.

As to France, she has returned to the Rhine and with the reconquest of the "Lost Provinces" has, like Italy, parted with an issue which has been in the back of all French minds ever since the Treaty of Frankfort. Real peace between Germany and France was impossible while Germany held Strasbourg and Metz.

To be sure, there is the German hope of reconquest, but one may take present German threats with a grain of salt. Seated on the Rhine and the Sarre, France has an immensely fencible frontier. To attack, Germany must now invade, not alone through Belgium but also through Holland, as some of her generals urged in 1914, and this means adding Dutch and Belgian armies to French and almost inevitably insures the reappearance of Britain on the Continent. Even the Sarre Basin, which is a thorny problem, can be disposed of when the hour arrives, thirteen years hence, without necessarily constituting a cause for war.

Paris Settlement Shows a Gain In West and South Despite Outcry

The simple fact is that the geographical settlements of the Paris Conference in the west and south, despite all the outcry which they have occasioned, represent a gain for European order as well as for racial integrity. Certainly economic adjustments between the succession States of Austria are essential, must come, but, deduction again being made for Austria, reasonable solutions are not impossible. Accepting for the moment the view that the reparations issue has passed out of the debate, European peace would seem probable were the western obstacles alone to be considered.

But it is at this moment that the Polish question takes on its true significance. We may believe that Germany, in the end and with reluctance, might accept the Alsace-Lorraine decision of the Treaty of Paris because the present and the future dangers of challenging it are enormous, would not impossibly bring Germany again into collision with the nations which defeated her in the recent war, all of whom have a debt of honor to France, so far as the question of Alsace-Lorraine is concerned. We may believe that the western frontier of Germany would be accepted by Germans as well as by Frenchmen and Belgians, just as it seems probable that what constitutes the natural frontiers of Italy will stand the test of time.

But can any German accept the Polish settlement? Let us concede at once that this settlement, so far as it has been made, represents an injustice to the Poles rather than to the Germans. The partition of Poland, engineered by Frederick the Great, was one of the supreme political crimes of all history. The steady colonization of Germans on territory which was clearly Polish has represented only the second step in the wrong done the Polish people. If Upper Silesia in whole or in part is retained by Germany more Poles will still live under German rule than Germans within the frontiers of the new Polish Republic.

But this does not in the least change the fact that the Treaty of Paris cut Prussia in half. It separated East Prussia from the main mass of the old Hohenzollern monarchy, thrusting the notorious Dantzig "corridor" northward. In giving the Poles Posen, a province in which the Slav majority was overwhelming, the Paris Conference made Berlin almost a frontier city. Granted that only a portion of the Silesian mineral fields fall to Poland ultimately, Germany will lose a considerable source of wealth and a portion of her resources for modern war, which is founded upon coal and iron beyond all else.

Every German statesman from Frederick the Great onward has spoken of all other problems of his country as minor by comparison with the Polish question. To believe that sixty or seventy millions of Germans will permanently endure a situation in which their country is divided by the Danzig strip, will accept the loss of Danzig, Posen, Thorn, Bromberg, to say nothing of other lands that may be lost in Upper Silesia, is to believe what is on the face of it impossible. Moreover, whatever be the expansion of Poland in the next two or three decades, whatever the gain in consolidation and reintegration, Poland cannot hope to be a match for the Germany which must presently become again a world Power.

In this situation the French policy makes itself felt. France, too, with a prospective forty millions of people a few decades hence, cannot resign herself to impotence in the presence of a Germany of seventy millions, setting out on a new career of conquest, with Poland as the first objective and the whole of middle Europe as an attractive artichoke, to be eaten leaf by leaf. Granted that the restored Germany might long delay an attack in the west, given its dangers, the time might well come even there when even British intervention would have no peril, no threat for a Germany expanded to cover all the lands between the Vistula and the Rhine and between the Baltic and the Black Sea.

Following 1870, French policy sought and found in the Russian alliance the only possible counterweight to German menace. France could not then stand alone against Germany; she cannot to-morrow. The British alliance will not suffice, for Britain does not and will not maintain an army based upon conscription. In 1914 Britain could get only four divisions to Mons in August, she had but six at the Marne in September, and the seventh did not reach Belgium until October. This small but infinitely precious reenforcement, moreover, was not sufficient to bridge the gap between German and French effectives.

It was the Russian offensive in East Prussia, not the British divisions, which saved France at the Marne, by compelling the Germans to send two corps and a cavalry division east before the decisive battle. To-day, with Russia gone, France must still seek an eastern ally, and that ally is, in the nature of things, Poland. With thirty millions of people, with a system of conscription, with an army trained under French direction, Poland can supply the numbers essential to insure French safety, to take off enough of the German mass to enable France to make good the Rhine barrier at the very least.

There, after all, is the naked truth of the new European situation. French safety depends upon Polish strength. If France is to be insured against a new German menace, that insurance must be found in Poland. But to obtain the Polish insurance France is bound to lend all her assistance to the Poles; she must stand with them against the Russians, as she did in the crisis of last summer, when Weygand and Jusserand went to Warsaw; she must stand with them in Upper Silesia. Every ounce added to the weight of Poland is an ounce taken off the burden of France on her own frontiers when Germany regains her strength.

But—and the fact is capital—Germany cannot and will not accept the Polish settlement. If an accident of war should bring an American defeat and, as Zimmermann in his notorious proposal suggested, California, New Mexico, Texas and Arizona should be returned to Mexico, can any one imagine the American nation accepting the decision? I am not suggesting the situations are intrinsically identical. Polish rights to Posen, West Prussia and Upper Silesia are something far more solidly founded on present ethnic conditions than the Mexican title to certain American States, but the German feeling in the present situation is precisely what the American would be in the instance I have suggested.

Prussia remains the dominant factor in Germany, and will remain. The greatness of Prussia was founded on the seizure of Silesia and the partition of Poland. Berlin, the Prussian as well as the German capital, is an open city barely a hundred miles from the new Polish boundary posts. East Prussia is divided from Pomerania by the Danzig corridor, and Danzig, one of the truly great German cities, is lost to Germany, while Konigsberg, which has a peculiar hold upon Prussian sentiment, is to-day the capital of an enclave in Slav territory.

Now, British policy, as contrasted with the French, has always looked at the question of peace. France has sought and seeks security. Britain, secure within her islands, aims at such adjustments in Europe as will avoid any war, and, above all, any war which may affect Britain. A century and a quarter ago British policy consented to the last partition of Poland, because it was a detail in obtaining Prussian and Austrian assistance in the war against the French Revolution, which was a menace to British security. At Paris, two years ago, Britain was ready to make any sacrifice of Polish interests to avoid the certainty of a later German challenge to the Versailles settlement.

The American must clearly grasp the essential difference in objective of the Briton and of the Frenchman, to see the truth in the latest European affair. Britain desires to avoid another continental war, so perilous to her commerce and her industry. In any war between Germany and France she would almost inevitably be dragged in, as she was before, because a victorious Germany at Calais and Antwerp would be a deadly peril for her. But such a war is almost inescapable if Poland be erected into a State, occupying most if not all of the truly Polish lands which were stolen by the Prussians under Frederick the Great and have been held in political servitude and against the will of their inhabitants ever since.

Recall British policy in the Balkans and the parallel is illuminating. The British under Beaconsfield were always ready to turn back Christian populations to Turkish butchers, because British policy aimed at restraining Russian advance on Constantinople, and the Christian populations of the Balkans, being mainly Slavs, seemed to British eyes certain to become tools of Russian ambition. British policy in the Baltic to-day is quite like British policy in the Near East in the days of the Congress of Berlin.

At Paris the British were ready and eager to make Poland the sacrifice essential to insure a going peace. They fought both the French and the Americans successfully, seeking reductions of the territories assigned to Poland, because they saw in such assignments the certainty of a later German war, which would involve the rest of Europe, almost ineluctably. And they were just as ready to sacrifice Poland to Russia, when the Red armies approached Warsaw and European stability seemed endangered by the Boishevist invasion.

French policy, on the contrary, supported the Poles in all cases, not primarily because there was a profounder French appreciation of the imminent justice of the Polish claims but because Poland was a factor, a vital factor in French security. As for the Americans they wandered between the two policies, on the whole seeking larger concessions for the Poles than were allowed, because Mr. Wilson adhered to his Fourteen Points, of which self-determination was one of the nearest to his heart. In the end it was Lloyd George who prevailed upon the President to reduce the Polish corridor and provide a plebiscite for Upper Silesia, originally assigned to the Poles.

To-day, in Upper Silesia, British policy follows the same course. It will necessarily continue to follow it. The more that is taken from Germany, irrespective of the moral claims of Germany to it, the more certain Germany is, when she becomes strong, to seek to recover the lost ground. But such an effort spells a new European war. Therefore, the British deem it the wise course to take as little as possible from Germany. Even the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France found British unofficial opposition before the armistice and finds present critics to-day, for precisely the same reason.

A week ago I dwelt upon the other phase of British policy, the desire to restrain France, become the greatest military power in Europe, the return to the traditional policy of the balance of power. This, too, is a dominating influence, but beneath all else lies the British instinct to avoid war by concessions, concessions which may sacrifice principle to practical considerations, but serve an obvious and unmistakable purpose.

Poland Already Has Enough To Excite Germany to Seek Revenge

It remains true, however, and here is the source of much contemporary British criticism of Fench pjolicy, that the solution which has so far been arrived at in the matter of Poland, negatives all British purpose and wish. To be sure Poland has not acquired all that France, or even the United States, as represented by President Wilson, would have assigned to her at Paris. But she has enough to insure German pursuit of revenge, of a new European settlement. Her frontiers can be maintained against Germany, when Germany recovers, only by force and by the force of France as well as of Poland. Even this force will not in the long run restrain Germany from trying to regain what she has lost of her old stealings. And this means a new continental war.

Take the British view from the British standpoint: Before and during 1914, Russia supported Serbia. Serbia was in dispute with Austria; the merits of the dispute are clear, but they are unimportant. As a consequence of this dispute came the Serajevo Tragedy, the Austrian Ultimatum, the decision of Russia to support Serbia, of Germany to back Austria, of France to remain faithful to her Slav Ally. Then came the invasion of Belgium and finally Britain was driven into a war, which in its origins did not touch her at all, that is in its apparent origins. While the question was Serbian, Sir Edward Grey manifested actual sympathy with the Austro-German case. While it was still Russo-German, he stood unmoved. Even when it became French half of his Cabinet were cold. But becoming Belgian, it became British.

Now here, beginning under British eyes, is a new condition quite comparable with the old. The British are not interested in the frontiers between Poland and Germany. They are not prepared to fight to sustain Poland, either against Germany or against Russia—just as the United States is not. But French policy makes an eastern policy a western question. If Germany acts against the Poles, France will move against the Germans. Germany can only fight France through Belgium and in a moment we are back at all the old evil circumstances of the World War, with all its terrible consequences.

Repetition of Great War Means Destruction for Britain and Europe

Put the thing very simply. The British want peace in Europe; peace because peace is essential to their own domestic existence, let alone prosperity, since the closing of the European markets brings ruin to British industry. To obtain that peace they are prepared to sacrifice Polish interests to German, just as they subordinated the interests of the small Balkan people to Turkish when Turkey was a vital factor in British foreign policy in the Near East. A continuation of present European unrest, a repetition of the recent war any time in the next century, means the ruin not alone of Europe but of Great Britain itself.

The French, on their part, want security. This security can be obtained only by the construction and maintenance of a Poland sufficiently strong to bridge the wide and ever growing difference between German and French population. France, therefore, must support and maintain all Polish claims which have a basis in right or a relation to French necessities in the matter of Germany. If Poland is crushed then France can no longer maintain herself against Germany, save as the British consent to an alliance and to an adoption of conscription—and the British will do neither.

As for the Germans, they will not accept Poland as it has been constructed; they would not have accepted any Poland which contained territory once included within German frontiers, although stolen by Prussian sovereigns in the past. And Poland without such territory would be economically first and politically later the mere creature of Germany, which would hold the Danzig gateway to the sea and possess all the coal, or most of it, which is essential to the development of Polish industry.

There, in a nutshell, is the real situation with respect of Poland and the truth about British and French policies. This is the chaos into which we Americans have just come, after having stayed out of European discussions for many, many months. If you read British newspapers you find great and always increasing irritation with the French because of their championship of Poland. Stripped of all camouflage this means that Poland constitutes in British eyes a danger to world peace, a possible occasion for British participation unwillingly in a new world struggle. It is the fact of Poland that the British with their unerring instinct in foreign politics object to, because the fact of Poland constitutes the greatest single danger to European peace henceforth as far as one can see.

Read the French newspapers, again eliminating all the portions of the articles which deal with moral and sentimental issues, and it will be seen that Poland is for France, the cornerstone of the new Europe, and French resentment at British policy, which has been constant at the Paris conference and since, grows out of the fact that, for the French, Britain in her readiness to sacrifice Poland seems in reality to be sacrificing France.

Actually European history to-day is beginning to revolve around a new pivot. New alliances are taking shape, new policies are coming to the surface, but most important of all political questions—accepting the reparations dispute as henceforth economic, which is a large assumption—is the Polish problem, of which the Upper Silesian dispute is only a detail.

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Golf Ball Leads Its Sports Brothers in Quantity

Expert Estimates 300,000 Dozen Costing $3,000,000 Are Used Annually on U. S. Links

The accompanying diagram shows graphically the annual consumption of golf, tennis and base balls in the United States, and the quantity and value of each type.



Only 130,000 Dozen Tennis Balls Demanded --- Guess About Baseballs Is One Million

CONSIDER the ball. It is frequently and vehemently described, especially during the week end, as the meanest of all inanimate things. But, considering its lot, it has a right to be.

In the good old days, which never are but always were, a sportsman desiring a little amusement would call together the gang of iron workers, mechanics and blacksmiths which was his valet, have himself inserted into a suit of galvanized clothes, and go forth on horseback to spear a neighboring sport similarly attired and of like disposition. It was a fine game for the winner, and the loser never appealed the decision.

A little later in the history of our civilization the seeker of recreation, deprived of messing up his fellow man by newly instituted game laws, would take his gun and make things interesting for other animals. Frequently, of course, he would also bag a man, but this was not considered cricket. The animals, however, have tired of this sport and retired into pots, deep forests and zoological gardens.

Nowadays the seeker of amusement thrusts himself into apparel fully as strange and almost as uncomfortable as that of his knightly predecessor and goes out in his tin six and picks on a small and unoffending ball. All the pent up human cussedness which formerly vented itself on fellow men and beasts is now heaped upon the ball.

As a general thing a man or woman does not wage warfare of the unrestricted type on more than one variety of ball. If he or she plays tennis, golf is regarded as highbrow and baseball as lowbrow. If baseball charms, golf is stated to be a thing for old men and tennis for sissies. If it is tennis that beats 'em all, golf is a game for those who enjoy walking on the grass without fear of being arrested and baseball a thing in which nine men band together to play parts that a single really energetic tennis player could handle all alone.

The mortality among these three types of balls is exceedingly high. It is rare for a ball that has really been in use to live to the ripe old age of one year. The first batter up in a baseball game, may, in response to requests from the stand, knock the cover off. Or he may hit it over the fence or foul it into the stands. In any case, its debut in the league is also its exit. In the two latter cases, sand lot artists will probably have a few whacks at it, but in any event the ingenuity of man has not yet devised a ball that can exist long in association with a bat.

Some of the Many Mean Traits Displayed by Golf Balls and Others

The peculiar form of meanness in which the golf ball delights is concealing itself from view. You are supposed to have your eye on the ball when you address it, but most golfers address it with greater zeal when it is concealed in an area of turf where it would be absolutely impossible to secrete a peanut. Revenge is sweet, thinks the golf ball in its little hole, as it listens cheerfully to the sound of the golfer finding it. And the vituperating golfer knows that at that particular minute he could knock that particular ball so far that the record drive would look like a mark set for croquet fans. The golf ball has undoubtedly decided upon hiding out as its means of defence because of its comparative indestructibility.

Inquiry into the subject of the manufacture of balls reveals a constant process of improvement. Manufacturers strive always to increase the pep of the ball and at the same time to lengthen its life. The baseball started life in 1845 on the Elysian Fields, where Hoboken now is, as a ball weighing six and a half ounces, measuring ten and a half inches in circumference, and containing a centre of two and a half ounces of rubber. It was covered with yarn and leather. Now it is five to five and a quarter ounces and nine to nine and one-quarter inches in circumferance, with a cork centre. The balls used in the old English game of rounders, the ancestor of baseball, were of various sizes.

As to the number of golf, tennis and baseballs in use, the subject is as wide as the United States and as long as the Mississippi River. It would be hopeless for even a weather prognosticator, who will guess on anything, to estimate, unless equipped with some special knowledge. Therefore THE NEW YORK HERALD requested Julian W. Curtiss, president of A. G. Spalding & Bros., who probably keeps a keener eye on the sporting situation than any other man in the country, to tell approximately the number of the three types of balls used.

Mr. Curtiss, after considering the question for twenty-four hours, estimated that 300,000 dozen golf balls, 3,600,000 little gutta percha spheres, are demanded yearly by insatiable wielders of the driver and putting iron. Tennis balls, he said, are bought at the rate of about 130,000 dozen, 1,560,000, a year. The great bulk of these are of American manufacture.

Concerning baseballs Mr. Curtiss declined to make an estimate. He explained that baseballs range in grade from the $2.50 cork centre ball used by the major and minor leagues, college teams and other amateur and professional players, down to the "baseball" made of rags with imitation leather cover retailing around twenty cents and used by juvenile players in back lots, streets, and meadows all over the country.

"Concerning the number of baseballs, I can only say that there are many times more of high grade golf balls than baseballs in use," Mr. Curtiss said. "Of all the baseballs sold every year the number of high grade is relatively low."

To many people the fact that more golf balls are used yearly than tennis balls comes as a surprise. Golf balls have an air of indestructibility and permanence about them not possessed by the softer tennis ball. The explanation probably is that golfers are really more numerous than the average observer imagines, and golf balls lead a harder life at the hands—or clubs—of heavy drivers than would seem possible. Golfers have a habit of hiding away their links in rather secluded places in the suburbs of cities or out in the open country, and their clubs are kept in lockers and not displayed so much upon the streets as tennis racquets.

The tennis player, needing much less space than the golfer, plays in the city or much nearer it in bold disregard of the number who may see him make a beautiful Lawford that almost clears the net, or a lob that lands the ball only a foot or so back of the base line.

Questioned as to the recent comparative increases in the demand for the three types of balls, Mr. Curtiss said that the golf ball has shown the greatest increase of late. In the last six years the demand for these has more than doubled. Both baseballs and tennis balls are demanded in greater numbers yearly, but they are not so popular as the golf ball.

One reason why the baseball has not leaped upward of recent years as much as might be expected is that a great many of the fans confine their enthusiasm for the national pastime to sitting in the shade of the grand stand and exercising their lungs.

"The increase in the demand for balls is not a sure indication of the increasing number of players," Mr. Curtiss said in discussing the increase in athletics in this country. "For instance, although the sale of tennis balls does not indicate a great jump in the number of players, there has been a large increase in the popularity of this game. Tennis balls of the present day, however, last much longer than the old balls did, so of course the number of balls per player is less.

"The old tennis ball had in it a rubber plug, which sometimes became loose or otherwise interfered with play and shortened the life of the ball. Now the two halves of the ball are joined by a process eliminating this plug and increasing the life of the ball. Another improvement is the cementing on of the cover instead of stitching it on. This has been a big gain. Our new processes make possible the elimination of part of the human element in the ball and the substitution of the surer machine."

The big manufacturers of balls compete more keenly than almost any other producers in their efforts to improve their articles. The Spalding company, for example, employs experts who work on nothing else. The manufacture of tennis, golf and base balls is as delicate a process as the making of a telescope, Mr. Curtiss said. The workmen are of the highest type, and a great number of balls are discarded as not up to standard.

The amount of money spent on balls alone is impressive. The golf ball, for instance, probably costs the players in this country about $3,000,000. In addition to this, of course, there is the cost of bags, clubs, gloves, membership dues, books of instruction, grips, shoes, stockings, other clothes, liniment, &c. Tennis balls, the best of which cost 60 cents apiece and are by far the greatest number used, cost close to a million dollars, in addition to racquets, nets, shoes, hats, flannels, sweaters, membership dues or rental of courts, grips, books, &c.

As for the baseball, the range from $2.50 to 20 cents and the uncertain number make estimates hard, but probably half a million dollars would not be overestimating this single item in the long list of equipment needed for the national pastime.

One item in the cost of sporting goods that the public probably does not realize it is paying is the tax of 10 per cent. Mr. Curtiss brought this out in speaking of golf balls.

"There has been no change in the price of golf balls in four years," he said. "The golf ball is probably the only article in this class. In that time the tax of 10 per cent. has been absorbed by the manufacturers. We have been enabled to do this by the decrease in the cost of rubber. As a matter of fact, however, the great increase in labor costs more than offsets this drop in rubber."

In connection with this 10 per cent. tax on sporting goods, which has been called by sportsmen "a tax on the physical wellbeing of the boyhood and manhood of the country," it is interesting that the tax on chewing gum, equipment for a very mild form of exercise, is only 3 per cent. The feminine half of America suffers less by taxes, for cosmetics, hair dyes, and talcum powder have a levy of only 4 per cent. upon them.

Standardization Most Important In Baseball and Tennis Ball

An interesting point in connection with balls is that tennis balls and baseballs have both been standardized much more than the golf ball. In golf no particular brand of ball has been adopted, but in the last year the rules have been changed by the United States Golf Association and the Royal and Ancient in Britain, to specify that a ball not smaller than 1.62 inches in diameter nor more than 1.62 ounces in weight be used in tournament golf. Any make can be used by individual players.

"The reason why no particular make of ball has been selected as official in the golf field is that only one player uses the ball in the course of the tournament," Mr. Curtiss said. "In tennis and baseball there has to be not only a standard ball, but one of a particular make, because with these balls the player is asking his opponent to use the same ball. Your ball may suit your style of play yet send him off his game.

"Baseball without a particular make would be chaos. For instance, a team of heavy hitters, like New York, might go over to Brooklyn. That team would introduce what is called a "punk ball," a ball that no one could hit much beyond the outfielders. On the contrary when Brooklyn came to New York the home team would introduce an exceptionally lively ball and proceed to knock it over the fence time after time.

"The only way to avoid this condition is to adopt a particular ball, as the big leagues have done, so that every one is tested as to size, weight, &c., so that all are precisely alike. In golf there is no need for this, as it is only fair that each player shall use the ball he finds fits his game best."

With daylight saving in effect in New York and many other communities throughout the country, it begins to look more and more as if the unfortunate baseball, the unlucky golf ball and the unhappy tennis ball were in this year for an unparalleled career of shooting through the air.